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S INCE its adoption in 1966 the Uniform Commercial Code1 has had an
enormous impact upon business ,transactions in Texas. Although the Code
was enacted to provide a degree of certainty and uniformity in the law
governing commercial transactions, the Code's complexity has produced
conflicting judicial decisions and interpretations. At the same time, signifi-
cant sections of the Code have been virtually ignored by the courts. The
purpose of this Article is to provide an over-view of recent significant
decisions. In doing so, attention will be focused on those cases which relate
to the more perplexing and misunderstood Code formulations.
The text of this Article has been classified under the headings of sales,
negotiable instruments, secured transactions, creditor's remedies, and recent
legislation. Although most of the analysis relates primarily to the Code,
there are several areas where it is inapplicable. In those areas, the common
law and recent statutory enactments must supply the answer.
I. SALES
A. Contract Terms and Acceptance
The UCC's treatment of uncertain contract terms was demonstrated in
Pacific Products, Inc. v. Great Western Plywood, Ltd.2 A purchase order
was submitted by the buyer, Pacific, specifying the total amount and various
grades of lumber to be delivered. However, the order was silent as to the
desired amount of each particular grade.3 A similar acknowledgment form
was sent by the seller, Great Western. 4 Pursuant to the buyer's written
instructions, the plywood was later shipped directly to Pacific's customer.
Upon receipt of the shipment the customer notified Pacific that the plywood
was not acceptable, as eighty-five percent of the shipment was of an inferior
grade. Following Pacific's formal notice of rejection,5 a reinspection was
* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Yale University. Attorney at Law,
Houston, Texas.
1. Uniform Commercial Code, 1972 Text with Comments, hereinafter referred to
as "the Code." This statute became effective in Texas in 1966 and is found in the Texas
Business and Commerce Code. Article 9 of the Code, dealing with secured transactions,
was amended in large part in 1973. Ch. 400, [1973] Tex. Laws 999. Textual refer-
ences will be to the Uniform Commercial Code; citations will be to the Texas Business
and Commerce Code where appropriate.
2. 528 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
3. Pacific's order form stated that all purchases were made in accordance with cer-
tain trade association grading rules and practices unless otherwise stated. Pacific or-
dered one carload of plywood composed of AC, BC, and "shop" grades, with the quan-
tity of shop grade to be no more than 5%. Id. at 288. The grading standards identified
three qualities, AC being the best, BC an intermediate class, and shop the poorest. Id.
4. The written acknowledgment and the purchase order crossed in the mail. The
acknowledgment form lacked the provision regarding association standards. Id. at 289.
5. This was done pursuant to § 2-602(1) of the Code. Thx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
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conducted by a quality control firm at Great Western's request. The
shipment was found to be in compliance with the standard agreed upon by
the parties, since at least ninety-five percent of the plywood shipped was of
the grades ordered. Nevertheless, Pacific refused to accept. Great Western
then sued for damages after selling the shipment at a loss. The trial court
found in favor of Great Western, holding that a valid contract existed and
that Pacific's rejection was improper.
Pacific's principal contention on appeal was that since the exchange of
forms failed to evidence an agreement on certain material terms, a contract
sufficiently certain to be enforced never existed. 6 The court of civil appeals
properly rejected this argument,7 basing its decision on the text of sections 1-
102, 1-205, 2-201, 2-202, 2-204, and 2-305 of the UCC.s The memoran-
da-order forms agreed on the quantity and type of goods sold,9 and the
absence of a fixed price term was not violative of section 2-201, the Code's
Statute of Frauds provision, 10 nor would it prevent the creation of a
contract." In fact, the forms involved in this case rendered section 2-201
inapplicable-the vendor's form evidenced a contract for the sale of a
specified quantity of goods, which was signed by both parties.' 2  Cir-
cumventing the requirements of section 2-201 (1) through the use of a
written confirmation does not, however, establish an enforceable contract,' 8
for the evidence, both written and oral, must still show that a contract was
made. 14  The court in Pacific Products had little difficulty finding such a
contract despite the dispute as to the grades of lumber. Under section 2-202
of the Code, parol evidence relating to course of dealing or usage of trade
can supplement the terms of written documents. 1 Further, after section 2-
ANN. § 2.602(a) (1968). The shipment contained 85% of BC grade, but 5% or less
of the plywood was of "shop" grade. 528 S.W.2d at 289. See note 3 supra and accom-
panying text.
6. Pacific argued that the number of units of each grade, the price for the total
quantity of each grade, the total quantity of plywood, and the final total price could
not be determined from the purchase order and acknowledgment. Therefore, the pur-
ported contract must fail due to the lack of expressed agreement as to certain material
terms. 528 S.W.2d at 290.
7. Id. at 292-94.
8. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. H9 1.102, 1.205, 2.201, 2.202, 2.204, 2.305
(1968).
9. The plaintiff sued on the basis of a thirty-unit car load shipment, thus avoiding
a dispute under the last sentence of TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (1968)
as to the quantity for which the agreement was enforceable. See notes 3, 4 supra and
accompanying text.
10. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE AN. § 2.201 (1968). The requisite writing need
only afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 1.
11. Under § 2-305 the parties can create a contract for sale even though the price
term is not settled. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.305 (1968).
12. A contract can be created by the conduct of the parties even though the writings
are insufficient to evidence a contractual agreement. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.204(a), 2.207 (1968).
13. The only term which must appear in the writing is quantity, and recovery is
limited to the amount stated. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-201(1), (3) (b), Com-
ment 1.
14. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Minister, 471 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1970).
15. Section 2-202 provides that course of dealing or usage of trade can explain or
supplement the agreed terms of the parties. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.202(1968).
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201 has been satisfied, parol evidence is admissible to clarify and establish
unsettled terms. 16 In Pacific Products the trial court had concluded that the
written sales acknowledgment form signed by Pacific and returned to Great
Western constituted a complete contract calling for an agreed upon quantity
with unspecified percentages of different grades of plywood.1 7 The evi-
dence before the trial court did not show industry usage as to percentages of
grades in the absence of specific agreement; nevertheless, the court of
appeals held that the trial court had sufficient evidence to find a valid
agreement despite these unexpressed percentages.' 8  Under the Code, an
agreement does not fail for indefiniteness provided the parties have intended
a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.' 9 Therefore, according to Pacific Products, where the evidence
shows that persons in the industry order lumber without specifying the
desired percentage of each particular grade, a contract will not fail for
indefiniteness simply because the grade percentages are omitted from the
writings.
In dictum the court examined Pacific's rejection of the goods. Great
Western argued that Pacific, by directing the carrier to deliver the car to
Pacific's customer promptly upon arrival, had waived any right to inspect
and reject the goods. Further, Great Western urged that Pacific's instruc-
tions releasing the car to the customer amounted to an acceptance of the
goods, since such conduct was inconsistent with Great Western's owner-
ship. 20 In support of this argument Great Western relied on Pittman-
Harrison Co. v. Fox Bros.,2 ' a pre-Code case where the buyer had unloaded
and stored nonconforming goods. The seller sued for conversion and the
court held that even though unloaded, inspected, and stored, the shipment
was still under the control of the seller. However, as the court properly
pointed out, the decision in Fox did not support the position of Great
Western. 22 In any event, the scope of section 2-606(1) (c), 23 relating to
16. Under the general theory of § 2-201 the successful plaintiff recovers on an oral
contract, not a written one. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE &
SUMMERS].
17. 528 S.W.2d at 291.
18. A contract existed for plywood of not more than 5% shop grade quality, the
balance to be distributed between grades AC and BC without restriction. See note 3
supra and accompanying text.
19. TEX. Bus. & COMM. COnE ANN. § 2.204(c) (1968). A very similar result was
reached in Tracor, Inc. v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., 484 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), involving a dispute over an order of "one-inch
sheetrock" where two types of "one-inch sheetrock" were available. That contract also
withstood an attack based on indefiniteness, but § 2-204 was not cited. Similarly, Tra-
cor was not cited in Pacific. The court in Pacific did not consider the possibility that
Great Western's shipment and Pacific's acts with respect to the handling of the carload
constituted conduct sufficient to show agreement under § 2-204(1). TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(a) (1968).
20. Section 2-606 provides that acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer does any
act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. Id. § 2.606(a)(3). Here the shipment ar-
rived consigned to Great Western, and was apparently made on a "straight" bill of lad-
ing. 528 S.W.2d at 295. Had this been a documentary sale, Pacific's inspection rights
would have been cut off. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.512, 2.513(c) (1968).
21. 228 S.W. 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ).
22. Not only was this a pre-Code decision but it was also directly contrary to Great
Western's position. 528 S.W.2d at 296.
23. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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acceptance by inconsistent acts, should be limited to the case in which the
buyer has attempted to reject and then engaged in conduct inconsistent with
the seller's ownership of the goods.24 Viewed in this light, Pacific's directing
delivery of the shipment before inspection raises no real issue as to accept-
ance or loss of inspection rights.
B. Risk of Loss
The proper allocation of the risk of loss during sale and delivery was
considered in Caudle v. Sherrard Motor Co. 25 Sherrard, the seller, brought
suit against Caudle, who had stopped payment on a check given in partial
payment for a house trailer. On the day the contract was made, but prior to
delivery, the trailer was stolen from Sherrard's place of business. The jury
found that, due to his failure to tender the balance of the purchase price,
Caudle had breached the contract, but that Sherrard had not suffered any
damage. However, a judgment non obstante veredicto was entered for the
plaintiff in an amount approximately equal to the purchase price.
Applying section 2-509 of the Code, the Dallas court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that since the trailer was stolen before the risk of loss had
passed to Caudle, the contract failed for want of consideration. 26  However,
the court did not invoke the reasoning process dictated by the Code. Under
section 2-507 the buyer's duty to pay for goods is conditioned upon a proper
tender of delivery. 27  Since Sherrard neither delivered the goods nor
asserted its right to cure, Caudle was under no duty to make payment.2
8
Hence, Sherrard would not have a claim against Caudle for non-payment. 29
Failure of the promised consideration is often said to give the promisee a
right to rescind the contract. However, this right is frequently asserted, as in
Caudle, as a defense to an action on the counter-promise.3 0 Therefore, a
more logical method of reaching the court's result would be to conclude that
Sherrard, upon whom the risk of loss rested, breached the contract by failing
to deliver the promised chattel, thereby relieving Caudle of any obligation
for payment.
The seller contended that the risk of loss had passed to the buyer, since
the seller, as bailee, had acknowledged the buyer's right to possession of the
trailer.31  The court's rejection of this argument cannot be faulted. Under
section 2-509 a bailee is defined as one who issues a document of title and
24. See WHrTE & SUMMERS § 8.2.
25. 525 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. Id. at 239.
27. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.507 (1968).
28. The right to cure an improper delivery is dependent upon seasonable notification
by the seller of his intention to cure. Id. § 2.508.
29. Conversely, Caudle would have been able to recover any payment if the prom-
ised delivery did not follow.
30. See generally 4 A. CoRBN, CONTRACTS § 1223 (1951).
31. Under the terms of § 2-509(2)(b), upon acknowledgment by the bailee of the
right to possess the goods, the risk of loss passes to the buyer where the goods are held
by a bailee to be delivered without being moved. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
2.509(b)(2) (1968). If the risk of loss as to destroyed goods is placed on the buyer,
he remains liable for the price under § 2-709. Id. § 2.709. Where the risk of loss re-
mains with the seller, he is liable for the buyer's damage due to nondelivery unless he
tenders a performance replacing the destroyed goods.
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contracts to deliver the goods, 32 and an issuer of documents of title is one
engaged in the business of transporting or delivering goods.83  Further,
section 2-509(3), which deals with merchants, tends to affirm the proposi-
tion that a seller in possession is not a bailee.34  In fact, it has been
suggested that except in unusual circumstances, a seller should not be
regarded as a bailee.3 5
Turning to section 2-509(3), the court held that Sherrard was a merchant
since it normally dealt in the sale of house trailers.36 The risk of loss,
therefore, remained with Sherrard until actual receipt by the buyer.3 7
Consequently, since the risk of loss had not passed to the purchaser, his non-
payment of the purchase price did not amount to a breach of the contract.
C. Breach of Warranty and Damages
As is customary, the past year produced a number of decisions regarding
the warranty sections of the Code, one of which was Elanco Products Co. v.
Akin-Tunnell,38 which returned for an encore. 39  The manufacturer of a
weed control product was sued for negligence and breach of express
warranty when the product failed to control weeds in a partnership's cotton
crop.40  Plaintiff-partnership had purchased the product after observing
numerous advertisements concerning its qualities, but the partner making the
purchase failed to read the manufacturer's warranty disclaimer on the
container label. In addition, the aerial spraying service that applied the
product failed to mix the chemical in the proportions suggested by the
manufacturer, nor did it observe the wind velocity restrictions enumerated in
a product brochure. 41
The jury found that the manufacturer had made an affirmation of fact or
promise that its product would control weeds, and that this became a part of
the basis of the bargain between the parties. Although the jury determined
that this warranty was conditioned on compliance with the manufacturer's
instructions as to mixing and wind conditions, the failure to comply was not
found to be a proximate cause of the alleged damages. Based on the
findings as to proximate cause and other facts absolving the spraying service
of negligence, judgment was entered denying any recovery against the
spraying service and awarding judgment against the manufacturer for the
damages sustained by the purchaser.
32. Id. § 7.102(a)(1).
33. Id. §§ 1.201(6) (bill of lading), 1.201(45) (warehouse receipt).
34. WHITE & SUMMERS § 5.3 n.18.
35. Id.
36. A merchant is one who "deals in goods of the kind . . . involved in the trans-
action." TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.104(a) (1968).
37. This rule is based on two theories: (1) control by the merchant over goods at
his place of business, and (2) the likelihood of insurance coverage. UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-509, Comment 3.
38. 516 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. The prior decision, 474 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971), re-
manded the case for new trial on issues of express warranty.
40. Further claims based on negligence were asserted against the party who had ap-
plied the product to the fields. 516 S.W.2d at 726.
41. Id. at 727-28.
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The argument of the manufacturer on appeal was that the buyer's failure
to comply with the manufacturer's instructions precluded recovery on the
express warranty theory, notwithstanding jury findings as to causation. This
contention required the Amarillo court of civil appeals to rewrite a rather
murky portion of its earlier opinion in which the court's language implied
that only those instructions which were part of the "bargain" need be
satisfied in order to recover. 42  In its later decision the court adopted the
position that compliance with all of the terms of an express warranty is
essential to a plaintiff's recovery on a warranty theory. 43  Therefore, in
reversing the lower court's judgment, the court held that the purchaser could
not recover from the defendant.
The result in Elanco goes somewhat beyond that reached in other Texas
decisions dealing with the necessity of compliance with conditions set out in
an express warranty, but comports with the view, espoused in other cases,
that a seller is the master of the terms of his offer. In London v. Curlee,44 a
pre-Code case, the court held that a purchaser's failure to comply with
several express conditions precedent defeated recovery based on an express
warranty theory. The plaintiff's failures in London were similar to those
involved in Elanco. In Veretto v. Eli Lilly Co.,45 directly supporting the
result in Elanco, the jury found that the plaintiff had followed acceptable
farming practices in applying the chemical. However, the trial court entered
judgment for the defendant-manufacturer notwithstanding the jury verdict,
since the general findings of the jury were not supported by any evidence
that the plaintiff complied with the application requirements as specified in
the instruction brochure. 4
6
Elanco also contains an unusual twist with respect to the issue of whether
the warranty instructions were part of the basis of the bargain. In W.G.
Tufts & Son v. Herider Farms, Inc.47 the jury found the purchaser's failure
to read and heed label warnings was a proximate cause of the economic loss
suffered. The court, however, held the label warnings were not a part of
the basis of the bargain, since the purchaser had relied on the seller's repre-
sentation that the product sold was identical to another product previously
used.48 By contrast, in Elanco strict compliance with the product's instruc-
tions was required by the court as a condition to warranty liability, despite
the fact that they were not supplied to the partnership at the time of pur-
chase. However, the instructions were known to the person hired by the
partnership prior to the application of the chemical. 49 In effect, this result
could be read to allow a seller to add qualifications to an express warranty
42. 474 S.W.2d at 793.
43. 526 S.W.2d at 732.
44. 336 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ).
45. 369 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Tex. 1974). For a discussion of the case see Larson,
Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 118, 133 (1975).
46. Veretto also refused to extend liability for consequential economic damages to
the remote manufacturer. Id. at 1255. Elanco did not deal with this possible issue.
47. 485 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 303. For authority the court cited the earlier decision in Elanco, 474
S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971).
49. 516 S.W.2d at 728.
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after sale but prior to use, similar to the expansion of a warranty by a
vendor's assurances following a sale.50
In Emmons v. Durable Mobile Homes, Inc. 1 the purchaser of a mobile
home claimed that the product was unfit for its intended use. In a suit
against the dealer, manufacturer, and financing bank, the purchaser sought
rescission and restitution. Plaintiff was denied recovery from the manufac-
turer on two grounds. First, in the absence of privity between the manufac-
turer and the plaintiff the contract theory seeking damages and rescission
was improper. Second, since the manufacturer had given an express written
warranty which negated any other express or implied warranty, including
any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness, the purchaser could not
rely upon breach of implied warranties. 52 Prior case law has supported this
view. 53
Lanphier Construction Co. v. Fowco Construction Co.54 also involved an
express warranty. Lanphier, the general contractor, sued its subcontractor,
Fowco, for damages caused by defective asphalt paving. The subcontrac-
tor, in turn, impleaded Servtex, its supplier. With the defendant's approval,
another type of asphalt paving had been substituted for that originally
specified in the contract. Servtex had warranted that the substitution would
meet certain highway specifications, but the new asphalt paving proved
unsuitable and had to be relaid. The jury found that Servtex had breached
express and implied warranties and the court entered judgment in favor of
Lanphier and Fowco.
On appeal Servtex contended that its express warranty regarding conform-
ity to the contract specifications excluded any implied warranty of fitness,
and, therefore, the submission of issues relating to the existence of the
implied warranty was erroneous. 55 The Code, however, contemplates that
warranties shall, if possible, be construed as cumulative and not exclusive,5"
and in the usual sales situation a conspicious written disclaimer is required to
exclude an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.57 This was
notably absent from Servtex's certificate. Further, the Code establishes a
special rule of construction favoring the preservation of such implied warran-
ties. 5s Thus, the court's rejection of this argument was clearly correct.
The court in Lanphier also considered the issue of whether an injured
subcontractor is entitled to recover the costs of repaving, or whether he is
limited to the usual breach of warranty measure, i.e., the value as warranted
less actual value. The court cited sections 2-714(2) and 2-715 in support of
50. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 7.
51. 521 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
52. Id. at 154.
53. See, e.g., Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); John Deere Co. v. Tenberg, 445 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Beaumont 1969, no writ).
54. 523 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. Id. at 40.
56. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.317 (1968).
57. Id. § 2.316(b).
58. Under the Code express warranties are said only to displace inconsistent implied
warranties other than the implied warranty of fitness. Id. § 2.317(3).
[ol. 30
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
a damage award based on the reasonable and necessary costs of repairing
the defective pavement, which included removing and repaving the parking
surface. The repair costs seem to fit within section 2-715(2)(a); 59 how-
ever, since the actual value of the substituted paving was zero, the calcula-
tion of damages could also be cast as warranty less actual value under
section 2-714.60
Several non-Code contract cases should be briefly mentioned in connec-
tion with issues relating to damages. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
McNair Trucklease, Inc.61 involved the breach of a five-year contract for
newspaper truck deliveries. McNair, the trucking concern, purchased new
vehicles in order to fulfill its contract obligations. The trial court judgment
allowed McNair to recover the capital outlay for the equipment, and this
decision was affirmed on appeal on the ground that the purchase of a capital
asset for the purpose of performing a contract is not a cost of performance
saved by reason of the breach. Therefore, the item need not be set off
against recovery of the contract revenues.
Although commentators have argued that a party cannot recover both the
amount of expenditures incurred in part performance plus the profits he
would have made if the contract had been fully performed, such a statement
is inaccurate. 62 Profits, in any proper sense of the term, do not include
expenditures. Thus, recovery of the full contract price, including a recovery
of profits plus expenses, less the cost of completing the work to be done after
breach is not a double recovery. A capital investment necessary to perform-
ance is not considered to be an expenditure in part performance except
insofar as it will be exhausted in the course of such performance. It is only
the depreciation, reasonably chargeable to the past performance actually
rendered by the plaintiff, that is an unrecoverable expenditure.6 3
An unusual contract damage question was presented in McCane Sondock
Detective Agency v. Penland Distributors, Inc.6 4 where a burglar alarm
system contract limited the agency's liability to twenty-five dollars for any
loss resulting from the alarm's failure to operate. Plaintiff's system was
connected to a "loop system" alarm which set off a flashing light when
burglars cut the wires at plaintiff's business. Believing that the signal was
caused by line trouble within the system, defendant failed to investigate.
The court held that the system was "operating" when the trouble signal was
given, thus precluding application of the damage limitation clause.
D. Miscellaneous
Kiser v. Lemco Industries, Inc.,65 a venue case, held that under a contract
59. This section provides that consequential damage includes any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements of which the seller at the time of contracting had rea-
sontoknow, ld. § 2.715(b)(1).
60. Section 2-714(2) states this formula to be the measure of damages for breach
of warranty unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
Id. § 2.714(b).
61. 519 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1036 (1951).
63. Id.
64. 523 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
65. 521 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
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calling for the purchase of grain at a specified price "F.O.B. Levelland,
Texas," the defendant-seller had contracted to perform an obligation in
Levelland. Therefore, the special venue rule of article 1995(5) applied,
permitting suit in the county where performance was due. 6  The court's
reasoning rested on section 2-319(1)(b) of the Code, which states the
"F.O.B. destination" is a delivery term obligating the seller to deliver the
goods, at his own expense and risk, to the stated destination.6 7 Consequent-
ly, the defendant-seller's performance obligation was placed in Levelland,
Hockley County, Texas.
Recently adopted article 1995(5)(b),68 establishing venue for, among
other things, extensions of credit for agricultural use in the county of the
defendant's residence or in the county where the contract was signed, was
construed in Castleberry v. Acco Feeds, Division of Anderson-Clayton &
Co.69 The buyer, who could 'be characterized as an "agri-businessman,"
was sued on an unpaid open account for feed sales. The delivery tickets
specified payment 'at the seller's Abilene office. When suit was filed in
Taylor County, the county of plaintiff's office, defendant filed a plea of
privilege to be sued in Burnett County, the county of his residence and the
county where he signed the delivery tickets. On appeal the court held that
the defendant's plea of privilege should have been sustained by the district
court, notwithstanding the plaintiff's argument that the stated venue provi-
sion was not intended to shelter the large agricultural businesses of the state.
In support of plaintiff's theory, one commentator has suggested that consider-
ation should be given to the mischief at which a statute was aimed and to the
remedial objective which was sought in order to reach a fair interpretation. 70
Wade v. Austin7' held that a real estate exclusive brokerage contract was
not unconscionable within the meaning of section 2-302 of the Code.72 This
novel attempt to incorporate the Code's unconscionability rules into this
context prompted the court to review thoroughly the unconscionability
doctrine.
A number of sworn account cases, which are contract cases in another
guise, were heard on appeal during the past year. In Big D Service Co. v.
Climatrol Industries, Inc.78 the court held that the four-year statute of
66. Article 1995(5) provides that, subject to the provisions of subsection (b), if a
person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, suit
may be brought against him in either that county or that of the defendant's domicile.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5) (Supp. 1975-76).
67. TEX. BuS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.319 (1968).
68. Article 1995(5) (b) states that in an action arising out of a consumer transac-
tion suit may be brought against the defendant either in the county in which the defend-
ant signed the contract or in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of
the commencement of the action. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5) (b) (Supp.
1975-76).
69. 525 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
70. See SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
71. 524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
72. Section 2-302 provides that the court can refuse to enforce a contract or any
contract clause if it finds it unconscionable. In making this determination, evidence re-
garding the commercial setting, effect, and purpose can be presented. TEx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (1968).




limitations provided in section 2-725 of the Code, 74 rather than the two-year
statute of article 5526(6), 75 applied to sworn accounts based on breach of
contract for the sale of goods. This decision follows the earlier, well-
reasoned opinion in Ideal Builders Hardware Co. v. Cross Construction
Co. 76
The necessity of strict adherence to the sworn account rules for both
plaintiffs and defendants was illustrated in several cases. In Oliver Bass
Lumber Co. v. Kay & Herring Butane Gas Co.77 the failure of a sworn
denial to adhere strictly to the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
93(k) 78 was held to preclude any dispute as to the account. However, in
Youngblood v. Central Soya Co.79 a deficient denial was held not to
preclude summary judgment in a sworn account action where a cross-action
and counterclaim were severed.
The failure of the plaintiff to state with sufficient specificity the items sold,
the dates of sale, and the reasonable charges in a sworn account petition
proved fatal in two cases.8 0 The court in Hollingsworth v. Northwest Na-
tional Insurance Co.8 ' held that an action to recover from an insurance agent
the amounts of unpaid premiums due on policies sold to third parties could
not be brought as a sworn account even though the defendant was liable
under the agency contract. The court distinguished cases involving sworn ac-
count suits to recover premiums on policies sold to the defendant. 82 Finally,
in Evans Advertising Agency v. Morphew83 the court relied on earlier cases
involving article 2226 in stating, though not clearly holding, that advertising
services are not within the scope of sworn account suits under rule 185.84
The court held that failure to introduce evidence of the actual performance
of the advertisements defeated recovery.
II. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Acceleration of Notes
Several cases reported during the survey period involved controversies
arising out of the acceleration of installment obligations and related foreclo-
74. Section 2-725 states that an action for breach of contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. A cause of action ac-
crues when the breach occurs regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of
the breach. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (1968).
75. Article 5526(5) provides that in actions upon stated or open accounts a two-
year statute of limitation is applicable. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(5) (1958).
76. 491 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
77. 524 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
78. This rule states that a pleading which states that an account which is the foun-
dation of the plaintiff's action is unjust must be supported by an affidavit. TEx. R. Civ.
P. 93(k).
79. 522 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. Hassler v. Texas Gypsum Co., 525 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975,
no writ); Unit Inc. v. Ten Eyck-Shaw, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. 522 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
82. Id. at 245.
83. 525 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
84. Article 2226 states that in actions on sworn accounts attorney fees can be recov-
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sure proceedings. In Allen Sales & Servicecenter, Inc. v. Ryan 5 the
maturity of a five-year installment note for $10,000 was accelerated four
days after the initial payment was missed. However, the payee failed to
demand payment of the overdue installment before accelerating. The Texas
Supreme Court, reversing the Fort Worth court of civil appeals,8 6 held that
section 3-501 a7 did not abolish the presentment for payment as a prerequi-
site to the exercise of an optional acceleration clause in a promissory note,88
despite the absence of such a requirement in the Code. 9 Recognizing that
acceleration was an extremely harsh remedy, the court held that equity
demanded notice of an intent to accelerate in the absence of clear legislative
intent to abolish the rule.90
In Vaughan v. Crown Plumbing & Service, Inc.91 an examination of the
equities of an attempted acceleration and foreclosure led the Houston court
of civil appeals to affirm a temporary injunction against foreclosure. The
court determined that since the creditor had exercised an acceleration
remedy, not to protect the collateral or the debt, but instead to coerce the
debtor into payment or forfeiture, a court of equity could properly intervene
to protect the debtor.92  In addition, the creditor's conduct as to previous
delinquencies was, in the court's view, a waiver of his right to accelerate for
similar defaults in the future, absent either a provision in the note that no
such waiver would result or a notice that future strict compliance would be
required. 93 Therefore, the trial court was well within its discretion in
applying its equity powers to protect the defaulting debtor from the operation
of the acceleration clause. 94
Similarly, in Stevens v. Bowie National Bank9" a creditor was found to
have waived prior delinquencies in payment. The court held that a bank
which had purchased a note and deed of trust with full knowledge that late
payments had been accepted was not a holder in due course,96 and., thus,
ered. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1975-76).
85. 525 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1975), rev'g 517 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974).
86. Allen Sales & Servicecenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 517 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1974), rev'd, 525 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1975).
87. Section 3-501 provides that, unless excused, presentment is necessary to charge
secondary parties. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.501 (1968). Presentment is
defined as "a demand for acceptance or payment." Id. § 3.504(2).
88. Ch. 123, § 70, [19191 Tex. Laws 198. Texas courts under the Negotiable In-
struments Act held strictly to the view that presentment was a prerequisite to accelera-
tion of maturity. However, it was possible to avoid the application of the presentment
provision by a carefully drafted waiver providing acceleration without presentment.
See, e.g., Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253, 214 S.W.2d 614 (1948). Since section 3.511
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code carries forward in more elaborate terms the
waiver provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, one would expect a similar result
in a case involving an appropriate waiver under the Code. Compare ch. 123, § 82,[19191 Tex. Laws 200 with TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.511(b)(1) (1968).
The note in Allen Sales contained no such waiver clause.
89. 525 S.W.2d at 866; see note 87 supra.
90. Id.
91. 523 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. Id. at 76.
93. Id. at 75.
94. Id. at 77.
95. 517 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ). [Editor's Note:
The Texas Supreme Court reversed this case. 532 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1975).]
96. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. H9 3.302, 3.304(c), (d) (1968).
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took the instrument subject to all defenses, including estoppel to acceler-
ate.97 This defect in the bank's suit led to the cancellation of the trustee's
foreclosure deed. 98
B. Accommodation Parties
The definition of "accommodation party" under section 3-415 of the
Code99 was interpreted in Jones v. San Angelo National Bank.10 0 Jones
and Vetterlein executed a promissory note for $100,000, and used the
proceeds to finance a construction corporation of which they were the sole
stockholders. After Vetterlein's death, his executor paid the balance of the
note and 'brought suit against Jones for contribution. Jones asserted that he
was an accommodation party and sought indemnification from the corpora-
tion for his liability on the note as principal obligor. The court, however,
held that the absence of the corporation as a named party to the note
excluded Jones from the literal definition of "accommodation party" set out
in section 3-415(1).101 By adopting a literal reading of section 3-415(1),
the court clearly followed the more reasoned course. In addition, the court
noted that even if section 3-415(1) had been read so as not to require the
name of the accommodated party to appear on the instrument, Jones could
not have qualified as an accommodation party under the circumstances of
this case. Relying on earlier Texas cases,10 2 the court concluded that even
if the proceeds were paid into the jointly-owned corporation, Jones could not
be an accommodation maker 'because, as a fifty percent shareholder of the
corporation, he benefited from the underlying consideration for the note.' 03
C. Guaranty and Suretyship Obligations
Consideration. Whitten v. Ailing & Cory Co.' 04 considered the suffi-
ciency of consideration for a guaranty of payment and the applicability of the
Statute of Frauds' 05 to an oral agreement not reduced to writing until after the
beneficiary of the guaranty had suspended sales to the principal debtor. The
Tyler court of civil appeals determined that the beneficiary's sales, in
reliance on the promised guaranty, constituted sufficient consideration for the
97. 517 S.W.2d at 688; see TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.306(2) (1968).
98. 517 S.W.2d at 689.
99. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.415(a) (1968) states: "An accommodation
party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his
name to another party to it." (Emphasis added.) The language of § 3.415(a), and
the problems of a literal reading of it, are discussed in Peters, Suretyship Under Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833 (1968).
100. 518 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Id. at 624.
102. Of the cases cited by the court, Motor & Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex.
276, 302 S.W.2d 386 (1957), and Otto v. Republic Nat'l Co., 173 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1943, writ ref'd), are the most persuasive. See also Wohlhuter v.
St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co., 16 UCC REP. SERV. 792 (Ill. App. 1975).
103. 518 S.W.2d at 624. Section 3-415(1) does not carry forward the concept that
an accommodation party sign "without receiving value therefore." UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 3-415(1), Comment 2. Compare UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAw § 29 with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415(1).
104. 526 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd).
105. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(2) (1968) provides that a promise
to stand good for the debts of another must be in writing.
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written guaranty. Although a guaranty given for a pre-existing debt must be
supported by new consideration, if the guarantor's oral promise was given as
an inducement to the advance of credit, the promise will be supported by the
beneficiary's action in reliance upon the assurances of a guaranty, even
though only later reduced to writing. 106 The subsequent execution of a
written guaranty to satisfy the Statute of Frauds does not invalidate the
earlier consideration supporting the guaranty.
Cobb v. Texas Distributors, Inc.10 7 dealt with another aspect of consider-
ation. Defendant, an officer and shareholder of a corporation, signed a
guaranty agreement form supplied by a credit rating agency which provided,
inter alia, that the agency could rely on the guaranty in making credit
reports, and could furnish copies of the guaranty to persons requesting
information regarding the company. Plaintiff, who had extended a line of
credit to the corporation prior to the execution of the guaranty, subsequently
learned of the guaranty and, in reliance thereon, continued to sell to the
corporation on credit. Based on this evidence, the court held that there was
sufficient consideration for the guaranty; therefore, the defendant guarantor
was liable for the unpaid balance on such sales. 108 The court rejected
defendant guarantor's argument that he should be liable only to the extent
the balance owed plaintiff exceeded the amount outstanding at the time
plaintiff learned of the guaranty. Since plaintiff had no continuing obliga-
tion to sell on credit, the court ruled that the damages sustained 'by plaintiff
should be measured by unpaid amounts due on sales made after plaintiff
began to rely on the guaranty. 109
The character of a maker as an accommodation party was raised in
Peterson v. Caylor.110 Peterson executed a note, guaranteed by plaintiffs,
to borrow money to pay a debt owed plaintiffs. On appeal from a judgment
for plaintiffs, who had paid the note as guarantors and then had sued
Peterson as maker, Peterson asserted he was not liable "as an accommoda-
tion maker." The court properly rejected this contention, stating that even if
Peterson were an accommodation maker, he signed the note personally and
was thereby liable as a maker;"' the argument that liability cannot be
imposed simply because of accommodation status is erroneous.
Independent Liability of Sureties. Bohart v. Universal Metals & Machin-
ery, Inc. 12 illustrated the continued uncertainty regarding the relationship be-
tween suretyship and negotiable instruments law, and the Code's effect on
that relationship. 13 Plaintiff, Universal Metals, had sold machinery to a
106. 526 S.W.2d at 248; accord, 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 213, at 286 n.26 (1963).
107. 524 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
108. The court also stated that because of the unconditional nature of the guaranty
no notice to the defendant was necessary. 524 S.W.2d at 345.
109. The court held notice of acceptance of the guaranty was not required, the sale
of goods being sufficient. 524 S.W.2d at 345.
110. 515 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
11l. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.415(b) (1968); see Peters, supra note 99,
at 838.
112. 523 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ granted).




Mexican company, taking a promissory note. The signature of the Mexican
company on the promissory note was a forgery, and plaintiff successfully
sued defendant guarantors on the guaranty. The question presented on
appeal was whether the guarantors, who had signed an absolute guaranty of
payment as primary obligors, were liable to plaintiff despite the forgery. A
majority of the Dallas court of civil appeals answered in the negative,
reasoning that the terms "guarantor" and "primary obligor" as employed in
the written guaranty were mutually exclusive, thereby creating an ambiguity
in the document as to the scope of the defendant's undertaking.
Under the doctrine of strictissimi juris such ambiguity was resolved in the
favor of defendant guarantors: the absence of a binding obligation on the part
of the principal relieved the guarantors of any liability. 114 Justice Guittard
disagreed with the reasoning of the majority. Finding the assumption of
guarantor status to be consistent with an intention to assume a primary
obligation, he would have held defendants liable as primary obligors despite
the forgery.1 5 An analysis of prior Texas decisions, cases in other juris-
dictions, and the language of the Code itself suggests that the reasoning of
Justice Guittard is correct. In Wood v. Canfield Paper Co." 6 the commis-
sion of appeals analyzed a number of Texas cases dealing with the nature of
guarantor's obligations under statutes and rules"17 which regulate the en-
forcement of claims against sureties and guarantors. The commission of
appeals in Wood held that the guarantor was entitled to the benefit of the
statutes governing suits against sureties, reasoning that the agreements before
the courts in those cases where a "guarantor" had been denied the benefits
of the protective statutes had actually imposed independent liability on the
guarantor, thus removing the "guarantor" from the statutes. 118  The same
logic would appear to be equally applicable in Bohart and would support the
dissent's view that the terms of the guaranty may be reconciled.' 19 Thus, the
"guarantor" may, under the terms of any given agreement, be liable to the
creditor independent of any obligation on the part of the maker.' 20
Decisions in other jurisdictions indicate that an absolute guarantor may
still be liable notwithstanding the fact that the principal's signature is forged.
Veazie v. Willis'21 involved a guaranty of payment which was not indorsed
on the note itself. The maker's signature and that of one indorser had been
forged; two other indorsements were genuine. The Massachusetts Supreme
114. 523 S.W.2d at 281.
115. Id. at 287.
116. 117 Tex. 399, 5S.W.2d748 (1928).
117. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1986-87 (1964); TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. §§ 34.01-.03 (1968); TEX. R. Crv. P. 30-31.
118. 117 Tex. at 408, 5S.W.2d at 751-52.
119. 523 S.W.2d at 288; see, e.g., Simon v. Landau, 27 Misc. 2d 269, 208 N.Y.S.2d
120 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (a reference to "primary obligors" in a guaranty of a corporate
debt held consistent with the concept of guaranty).
120. L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP (1950) was cited by both the majority and dissenting
opinions. The majority relied upon it for the proposition that the forgery of the princi-
pal's signature is a risk borne by the creditor who deals with the principal. Id. § 54.
The dissent pointed to id. § 55 for the proposition that a surety can undertake a greater
obligation than that of the principal. The phrase "primary obligor(s)" could well be
interpreted as showing an undertaking that was not tied exclusively to the principal debt.
121. 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 90 (1856).
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Court held that the payment of the note had been guaranteed regardless of
the forgery.' 2 2  Veazie did, however, concern a note in which at least some
indorsements were genuine, and, therefore, "the paper was not . . . a
wholly fictitious paper .... ,,123 Newark Finance Corp. v. Acocella 24
involved an absolute guaranty indorsed on the note itself and a forged
maker's signature. Although the holding in Acocella did rest in part upon
indorsement liability, 2 5 the court stated an alternative holding that the
forgery of the maker's signature did not relieve the accommodation indorser-
guarantor of liability. 120
Finally, the language of the Code itself would appear to support the
reasoning of the Bohart dissent. First, the comment to section 3-416 of the
UCC indicates that one who signs a note as an accommodation indorser and
guarantees payment has a liability "indistinguishable from that of a co-
maker.' 27 The position taken by the Code regarding the liability of the
indorser-guarantor indicates that this obligation should survive the forgery of
the maker's signature and supports the view that guarantors under agree-
ments such as that involved in Bohart incur primary and independent
liability. Second, "under the Code, the word 'surety' includes all 'guaran-
tors' and 'accommodation parties.' ",128 Although the Code does not explic-
itly state the effect of the treatment of guarantors as sureties,' 29 the
distinction under the Code between the guarantor of payment, whose
undertaking it is to perform "without resort to any other party,"'8 0 and the
traditional surety' 8 ' is diminishing'32 and is, therefore, subject to criticism.
Third, although the point was not discussed in Bohart, the plaintiff ap-
peared to have qualified as a holder in due course.' 38  At least one
commentator has suggested that in a situation such as that presented in
Bohart the interests of the remote holders in due course should take prece-
dence over a surety centrally involved in the negotiation of the note. 184 The
argument is persuasive and suggests quite strongly that the dissent in Bohart
was correct.'
8 5
122. Id. at 94.
123. Id.
124. 115 N.J.L. 388, 180 A. 862 (1935).
125. Compare UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 66 with UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 3-417(2).
126. 180 A. at 864. Other cases which contain language to the effect that an ab-
solute guarantor is liable, regardless of forgery of the maker's signature, may be more
accurately classified as resting on the warranty liability of an indorser-guarantor. See,
e.g., Holm v. Jamieson, 173 Ill. 295, 50 N.E. 702 (1898); First Nat'l Bank v. Bair, 315
Pa. 463, 173 A. 329 (1934).
127. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-416, Comment.
128. Id. § 3-415, Comment 1. See also TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201
(40) (1968).
129. Since § 1.201(40) states "'Surety' includes 'guarantor, it is possible that under
the Code either (a) guarantors are a subset of sureties, all of which have primary liabil-
ity, or (b) "surety" is used for both direct and collateral undertakings.
130. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (1968).
131. The surety's liability is frequently called "immediate and direct," as distin-
guished from the guarantor's "contingent liability." See A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURE-
TYSHIP § 6 (1902).
132. See Peters, supra note 99, at 841.
133. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(b) (1968).
134. See Peters, supra note 99, at 863.
135. The case is admittedly a close one and the phrase "principal obligor(s)" must
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An ancillary issue in Bohart involved defendant guarantor's claim that he
was free from liability because the promissory note charged a usurious rate
of interest. Although this issue was not resolved in Bohart, it raises
questions of interpretation of the Texas corporate borrowing statute and its
exclusions from the usury laws.13 6 In Sud v. Morris137 the Beaumont court
of civil appeals held that when an individual and a corporation execute a
"joint and several" note as co-makers, the individual has a cause of action
for usury which may be pursued without joinder of the corporate party. Sud,
however, did not address the question of whether the individual co-maker
was an accommodation party under section 3-415 of the Code. It has been
held elsewhere that an accommodation co-maker may not assert usury as a
defense where the principal maker is barred from raising the defense.13 8
The corporate borrowing statute itself excludes "such corporation, its suc-
cessors, guarantors, assigns or anyone on its behalf" from asserting the
defense of usury.' 3 9
The proper resolution of this problem was suggested by the decision in
E'Town Shopping Center, Inc. v. Lexington Finance Co.,' 40 which also
involved a guaranty agreement. The court in E'Town accepted the proposi-
tion stated in the comment to section 3-416 that "the liability of a guarantor
[of payment] is made the same as that of a co-maker [but] it does not follow
that he is in fact a co-maker . . . . [Under section 3-416] one who is
technically a 'guarantor' is in the same position as a surety with respect to
the enforceability of the obligation without first proceeding against the
principal.' 4' The language of article 1302-2.09 should be construed to
facilitate, rather than impede, the flow of capital to corporate borrowers.
Therefore, the term "guarantor" should be interpreted to include the defend-
ants in Bohart even though the guaranty provides for independent liability.
Discharge. Two cases during the survey period dealt with novel aspects of
guaranty law. Diamond Paint Co. v. Embry142 arose on complicated facts
which may be summarized as follows: Embry funded a loan to Diamond
Manufacturing, one of several corporations closely linked and dominated by
Shepherd, a businessman active in many business and promotional activities.
The loan in question was guaranteed by Shepherd and two of his corpora-
tions, Diamond Industries and Diamond Paint. In addition, Embry obtained
"take-out commitments" from plaintiffs, Ladin and SBIC. When Diamond
Manufacturing defaulted on the note, Ladin and SBIC were called upon by
Embry to perform their obligations under the take-out agreements. After
paying Embry the principal amount of the note, Ladin and SBIC sued
carry the laboring oar in the dispute. However, the phrase should have some meaning
in the guaranty, and it is suggested that the dissent sets out the better position. See
523 S.W.2d at 287 (Guittard, J., dissenting).
136. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1975-76).
137. 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
138. See, e.g., Raby v. Commercial Banking Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 52, 220 A.2d 659
(1966).
139. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1975-76).
140. 436 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
141. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
142. 525 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Diamond Manufacturing on the note and Diamond Paint on its guaranty.
Embry also sued for the difference between the principal amount received
and the full value of the note. Defendants argued that Ladin and SBIC
were "guarantors." Consequently, the settlement between Embry, the princi-
pal creditor, and Ladin and SBIC released the defendants from their
guaranty obligations. 143
The court disagreed with the defendants, holding that the take-out
commitment, although "functionally additional security," was not a guaranty
of payment.' 44 On these facts' 45 this result seems correct and preferable to
a situation in which the parties receiving the benefit of the money are' free
from all liability. Furthermore, a holding that a take-out commitment letter
constituted a guaranty could have significant impact on lending practices if
guaranty law were incorporated wholesale into financing arrangements.
Diamond Paint also contended that its guaranty was unenforceable be-
cause it violated article 1302-2.06 of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporations
Act.' 46  In deciding this question the court relied on section B of article
1302-2.06, which permits corporate guaranties of obligations of subsidiary
parent, or affiliated corporations.' 4T The court held that the guaranty was
legal since it was authorized by statute and did not contravene any public
policy.148
Tomlin v. Ceres Corp.149 also involved a guarantor's claim of discharge.
Defendant Neuman guaranteed partial payment of a note given by Ceres
Ranches, a limited partnership, to plaintiff, a trustee for a number of its
creditors. Defendant Mitchell T. Curtis & Co. also guaranteed partial
payment and executed an indemnity in favor of Neuman. When Ceres
Ranches failed to make the note payments, an extension agreement was
entered into between Mitchell T. Curtis & Co. (the co-guarantor) and
plaintiff (the payee of the note). When sued on the debt Neuman argued
that this agreement effected a discharge by altering the guaranty obligations.
Disagreeing, the court stated that the agreement was merely between one co-
143. See Miller v. Miles, 400 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), for a discussion of the measure of a guarantor's contribution claim. If the set-
tling guarantor pays less than the full amount of the claim, the contribution liabilities
should be decreased pro rata.
144. 525 S.W.2d at 532. Under the "take-out" agreement, Ladin and SBIC were ob-
ligated to purchase the note should the maker default. Following purchase of the note,
they stood in the shoes of the payee with his rights against the maker and the collateral
securing the note including the right to proceed against the guarantors on the note.
Therefore, these take-out commitments should not be classified as guaranties.
145. Ladin and SBIC had originally been approached as lenders by Diamond Paint.
This fact would indicate that these parties were involved in some capacity other than
as guarantors.
146. The court based its decision on the statute that was in effect when the guaranty
was given. Ch. 469, § 3, [1963] Tex. Laws 1184, as amended by ch. 285, § 1, [1973]
Tex. Laws 676.
147. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06B (Supp. 1975-76).
148. Of particular note was the court's interpretation of the 1973 amendment to ar-
ticle 1302-2.06, which provides that corporate guaranties are permissible where they di-
rectly or indirectly benefit the corporation, as indicative of the trend of public policy
toward the approval of such guaranties and the ease of restrictions on their use. Ch.
285, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 676, amending ch. 469, § 3, [1963] Tex. Laws 1184; 525
S.W.2d at 636.
149. 507 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1975).
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guarantor and the payee rather than between the payee and the principal
debtor, and, therefore, the guarantor's position under the original agreement
had not been affected. 1 50
Guarantor's Liability for Attorney's Fees. Three cases decided during the
survey period dealt with a guarantor's liability for attorney's fees. In Ganda
Inc. v. All Plastics Molding, Inc.151 the court, following prior Texas
decisions, 152 held that a guarantor was not liable for attorney's fees absent
an express liability provision in the guaranty. 5 3 The court in Woods
Exploration and Producing Co., Inc. v. Arkla Equipment Co.-5 4 held that
where a guaranty provided for reasonable attorney's fees based on a
percentage of the outstanding debt, a fact issue as to the reasonableness of
the attorney's fees precluded summary judgment on that portion of the
suit.' 55
In Coward v. Gateway National Bank' 56 plaintiffs brought suit on a
promissory note which included a provision for reasonable attorney's fees. At
trial, plaintiffs obtained a summary judgment, and consequently, attorney's
fees were granted in accord with plaintiff's affidavit. The court of civil
appeals, utilizing the 1971 amendment to article 2226,157 took judicial
notice of the state bar minimum fee schedule and suggested a remittitur to
conform with the schedule. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
summary judgment procedure was improper in that the 1971 amendment to
article 2226 applied only to suits within the scope of article 2226.158 In
what must 'be considered dictum, the court expressed the view that the 1971
amendment was limited to non-jury trials.159 The court stated that it would
continue to apply a strict standard of summary judgment proof regarding
reasonable attorney's fees. Since plaintiff's affidavit was not conclusive, the
fee issue was remanded to the district court. 16 0
D. Usury
A number of significant usury decisions were rendered during the survey
period. In Southwestern Investment Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delint-
ing, Inc.161 the terms of a loan provided for more than the statutory
150. Id. at 648. The court in Tomlin noted that the guarantor's right to pursue the
primary debtor would be inconsistent with the extension between the other guarantor
and the creditor.
151. 521 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. See, e.g., Blume v. Nat'l Homes Corp., 441 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1969).
153. 521 S.W.2d at 944.
154. 525 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), af'd, 528 S.W.2d
568 (Tex. 1975).
155. 525 S.W.2d at 52.
156. 525 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1975), rev'g 515 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1974).
157. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 226 (Supp. 1975-76) provides for the recovery
of attorney's fees in certain cases, and as amended in 1971 further states that the state
bar minimum fee schedule shall be prima facie evidence of a reasonable fee.
158. 525 S.W.2d at 859.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 860.
161. 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e., 516 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. 1974) (per curiam).
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maximum ten percent annual interest in the early years of the loan, which
would be offset by lower rates in later years. The trial court found that
during the first year, and for the first six months of the second and third
years, the loan was usurious, since the borrower had to pay in excess of ten
percent interest. 1 2  The lender contended on appeal that the loan was not
usurious, since the total amount of interest, spread over the life of the loan,
was less than the total amount that would have resulted if a straight ten
percent had been charged each year. The court of appeals, citing as
authority Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp,16 3 adhered to the traditional rule
that "a loan contract is considered usurious if for the first year or first few
years it requires the payment of interest in excess of the lawful rate, even
though the interest calculated over the entire loan period does not exceed the
statutory limit."'1 64  Thus, in light of the per curiam refusal of error by the
supreme court, the opinion of the court of civil appeals and the acceptance
by some jurisdictions of the practice of spreading the interest over the term
of the loan,165 it appears that such practice is still subject to question in
Texas.
Wall v. East Texas Teachers Credit Union'6  involved the interpretation
of a note in a usury context. The promissory note recited the principal
amount as "Nineteen hundred eight hundred ninety-six and 01/100 Dol-
lars"; the note showed the face amount to be "$19,896.01." The court held
the written expression to be ambiguous in the context of the note167 and,
under section 3-118(c) of the Code,'08 the amount clearly expressed in fig-
ures established the correct amount of the note. However, the note, even as
so interpreted, called for the payment of usurious interest. 169 The borrower
argued that, due to the usurious character of the note, he was entitled to a
credit of an amount equal to twice the interest, despite the fact that usury
had not been specifically pleaded as an affirmative claim for the statutory
penalty.' 70 The court held that the 1967 amendments to the usury laws,
162. The corporate exception statute, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09
(Supp. 1975-76), was inapplicable because the loan was executed prior to adoption of
the new statute which was not retroactive. See Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc.
v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 476 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). This decision is discussed in Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 85, 120 (1973), and in Larson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 67, 75-76 (1973).
163. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940).
164. 511 S.W.2d at 732.
165. See Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest in Ad-
vance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748, 754 and nn.44-48 (1975), for an analysis of decisions in other
jurisdictions.
166. 526 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ granted).
167. Id. at 150.
168. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(3) (1968) states: "Words control fig-
ures except that if the words are ambiguous figures control." See Mees v. Canino, 31
Colo. App. 514, 503 P.2d 1036, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 1212 (1972); Guthrie v. National
Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1965).
169. On a loan of $19,896.01, repaid over four months in installments, the lender
received $20,803.48, or something in excess of 1% per month (as stated on the note)
on the original balance.
170. The defendant had pleaded that the note represented an "illegal" and "unen-
forceable" loan. 526 S.W.2d at 151-52.
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which changed the dual penalty171 rule to a forfeiture concept, 172 allowed
the borrower to recover the penalty by means of a credit without a specific
counterclaim or similar affirmative defensive pleading.' 7 3  Further, under
rule 93,174 the defendant's pleading, which was viewed as raising the issue
of usury, was not required to be verified because "simple mathematical
calculation" demonstrated the note to be usurious. 175
In Johns v. Jaeb176 plaintiff and defendant had entered into a limited
partnership agreement wherein defendant ostensibly "contributed" $5000 as
capital. Simultaneously plaintiff had agreed to purchase defendant's interest
in the partnership, executing a promissory note for $6500. When business
declined and plaintiff was unable to repay the note, he brought suit alleging
that the purchase was, in reality, a loan with usurious interest. The court
considered two issues of usury law. The first issue was whether the
partnership agreement was actually a loan for which usurious interest had
been charged. 177 Following established precedent, the court held that when
money is advanced with the understanding that the advance plus an added
amount are to be returned, there is a loan which must conform to statutory
interest limitations. 178 The nature of defendant's investment illustrated that
he had not placed his money at risk in an enterprise but had merely assumed
the role of a creditor.
The second issue concerned the applicability of article 5069-1.06 which
provides that any person "who contracts for, charges or receives" usurious
interest shall be subject to penalties. 79 In Johns $1500 was "contracted
for" as interest for the use of $5000 for a period of six months, an amount
far in excess of the permitted rates. As was determined in Lafferty v.
A.E.M. Developers & Builders Co.,180 the forfeiture of principal under
article 5069-1.06(2) includes both paid and unpaid amounts. However, in
Lafferty the entire balance had been discharged before suit was brought;
171. Former art. 5071 provided that usurious contracts were void as to the interest,
but principal could be recovered; this was a purely defensive remedy. Ch. 6, § 1,
[1892] Tex. Laws 4, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 368 (1898), repealed by ch. 274,§ 5, [1967] Tex. Laws 659. Former art. 5073 allowed recovery by an "action for debt"
of twice the usurious interest "received and collected." Ch. 143, § 1, [1907] Tex. Laws
277, repealed by ch. 274, § 5, [19671 Tex. Laws 659.
172. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (1971) provides in essence that a
lender charging usurious interest forfeits twice the charged interest plus the principal.
173. 526 S.W.2d at 151-52.
174. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93 requires certain pleas, including usury, to be verified, unless
the "truth of such matters appear of record."
175. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d
724, 732-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e., 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974)
(per curiam).
176. 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
177. The limited partnership documents included: (1) a limited partnership certif-
icate showing the defendant as limited partner and the plaintiff as general partner, with
defendant's contribution being $5,000 and his share of profits at 99%; (2) a side agree-
ment for plaintiff to "purchase" the partnership assets for $6,500; (3) a $6,500 promis-
sory note payable to defendant in six monthly installments. Id. at 859.
178. Id. For a discussion of the relevant law, see generally Comment, Lender Par-
ticipation in Borrower's Venture: A Scheme To Receive Usurious Interest, 8 Hous.
L. REV. 546 (1971).
179. Prior Texas law limited the penalties to those cases where usurious interest had
been "received or collected." Ch. 143, § 1, [1907] Tex. Laws 277, repealed by ch. 274,
§ 5, [1967] Tex. Laws 659.
180. 483 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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here, the plaintiff had paid only one-third ($2166.66) of the face amount of
the note.
In computing the penalty, the court did not allocate the payments made
between interest and principal, since article 5069-1.06(1) applies to interest
"contracted for, charged or received." Thus the lender was assessed $3000
as the double interest penalty. In addition, under article 5069-1.06(2) the
lender forfeited "as an additional penalty all principal as well as interest."
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover the whole sum of the principal since he
had made only two payments. The court therefore subtracted the outstand-
ing balance of $4333.34 from the total judgment of $8000 and awarded
plaintiff a net judgment of $3666.66 plus reasonable attorney's fees. This
recovery put the parties in the same position as if plaintiff had paid the
entire note and then recovered twice the interest charged plus the principal.
Corporate Borrowing Exemptions. Two recent decisions, both from the
Dallas court of civil appeals, dealt with the availability and use of the
corporate borrowing exemption.' In Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage
Co.' 8 2 the 'borrower urged that he had incorporated at the insistence of the
lender in order to enable the latter to charge interest at a rate in excess of
ten percent per annum by utilizing the corporate exemption. In dictum' 83
the court approved the view expressed in other jurisdictions18 4 that the mere
fact that the corporation was formed in order to obtain the loan does not
render the transaction void or illegal.' 8 5
In American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd.'8 6 the
issue was more subtle than the coerced incorporation argument asserted in
Skeen. Here the borrower argued that the loan was usurious, since the
actual borrower was not the corporation which had signed the note and deed
of trust, but rather a limited partnership for whose benefit the corporation
was acting. 1 87
The limited partnership had originally secured the commitment from a
mortgage company. However, on the mortgage company's advice, the
original commitment was modified to change the borrowing entity to a
related corporation.' 88 Corporate documents, not revealed to the lender,
181. By statute, corporations can agree to any interest rate not exceeding 1 % per
month on any bond, note, debt, contract, or other obligation so long as the principal
amount is five thousand dollars or more. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09
(Supp. 1975-76).
182. 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ), noted in 29 Sw. L.J.
959 (1975).
183. The court held that the trustee's affidavit failed to set out the facts necessary
to sustain the summary judgment. 526 S.W.2d at 255. Therefore, the court's discussion
of the incorporation issue was unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
184. See, e.g., Tel Serv. Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1969);
Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930). The literature on incorporation
and usury law is extensive. See, e.g., Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial
Lending, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 419 (1971); Comment, Using a "Dummy" Corporate Bor-
rower Creates Usury and Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974).
185. 526 S.W.2d at 256.
186. 529 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. Id. at 582.
188. The corporation was a functioning corporate vehicle used by Campbell, the or-
ganizer of the limited partnership, in his real estate activities and had been incorporated
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showed that the corporation was taking title as trustee for the partnership,
and a deed conveying the land from the corporation to the partnership was
placed in escrow with the corporation's attorney. The plaintiff-partnership
alleged that it was not only the equitable owner of the land, but was also the
actual beneficiary-obligor of the loan. The plaintiff's primary argument was
that the lender's failure to investigate the circumstances of the transaction
amounted to the making of a usurious loan. The court held that the
plaintiff, whose own evidence showed an intent to deceive the lender and
whose agents participated in concealing the partnership's interests, could not
obtain the advantages of the usury laws on the theory that the party deceived
should have discovered the facts being concealed.
III. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Priorities
The Fifth Circuit, on remand in the case of In re Samuels & Co.,' 8 9 held
that under article 2 the reclamation rights of unpaid cash sellers, who reserve
title to goods sold to a bankrupt shortly before bankruptcy, have priority
over the claims of both a perfected inventory financer of the bankrupt and
the bankruptcy trustee armed with the status of a hypothetical lien creditor.
The facts of Samuels are no doubt familiar to aficionados of Code litiga-
tion.190 Several sellers delivered cattle to Samuels, a meat processor, under
agreements reserving title. After processing, the sale price was determined
on the basis of the "grade and yield." Samuels' payment checks were
dishonored due to the refusal of C.I.T. Corporation, a secured inventory
financer of Samuels, to advance the additional funds needed to cover the
checks. Samuels immediately filed for bankruptcy. The sellers and C.I.T.
each asserted rights to the proceeds of the cattle.
The court first considered the sellers' claims to priority over the secured
creditor under sections 2-507 and 2-511.191 The court concluded that
under these facts the transaction was a "cash sale" and not a credit sale
which would have been governed by section 2-702.192 The court, relying
on the comment to section 2-507,193 found that an unpaid cash seller had a
right of reclamation as against the buyer under the Code.194  The critical
in 1970. The court was willing to assume that the requirement of a corporate borrower
was imposed by the lender. Id. at 580-8 1.
189. 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975) (rehearing en banc granted, May 19, 1975).
190. The prior appeals are reported at 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974).
191. Section 2-507(2) provides that where payment is due and demanded on the de-
livery to the buyer of goods his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them
is conditioned upon his making the payment due. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
2.507(b) (1968). Section 2-511(3) states that payment by check is conditional and is
defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check upon due presentment. Id.
§ 2.511 (c).
192. Under § 2-702(3) the reclaiming credit seller's right of reclamation is subject
to the rights of a "good faith purchaser or lien creditor." Id. § 2.702(c).
193. The comment provides that an unpaid seller may reclaim goods delivered on
credit to an insolvent buyer. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-507, Comment 3.
194. This right of reclamation is apparently subject to the 10-day rule of § 2-702.
In this case, however, the court found that the "underlying purpose" of the 10-day rule
had been satisfied by the action of C.I.T., the competing secured creditor, even though
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issue concerned the relationship between the sellers' right of reclamation
and the perfected inventory financer's rights as a secured creditor under
article 9. The court was willing to concede that, since the cattle were in
Samuels' possession, the security interest of C.I.T. had attached under
section 9-204, which requires, inter alia, that the debtor have "rights in the
collateral.' 195 The court, however, held that C.I.T.'s rights in the collateral
as a secured creditor are derived from, and are no greater than, the rights of
the debtor.196
Although this position has been accepted elsewhere, 197 it is based upon an
erroneous reading of the Code. The key to this issue is found in section 2-
403, which recognizes that one with "voidable title" can transfer good title to
a "good faith purchaser for value" even though the initial transaction was a
"cash sale" and payment was not made.' 98 The secured creditor who has
given "value"' 99 and who acts in "good faith" 200 should qualify as a
"purchaser" 201 entitled to protection under section 2-403. Since C.I.T. had
given value by financing Samuels' operations and had, therefore, come
within the scope of the purchaser requirement, the only question remaining
was whether C.I.T. had met the Code "good faith" requirement. Section 1-
201(19) of the Code defines "good faith" as honesty-in-fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned.20 2 The majority of the court found that C.I.T.'s
knowledge of Samuels' business and the likely effect which its refusal to
advance additional funds would have upon its debtor barred C.I.T. from
claiming that it had acted in "good faith." Although the majority would not
require a creditor to continue financing a sinking business, its interpretation
of the "good faith" concept seems erroneous in light of the business realities
of secured lending. If mere knowledge of a third-party claim is sufficient to
defeat good faith purchaser status, then the use of section 2-403 by the
inventory financer as a means of cutting off the claims of suppliers will be
frustrated.
The rights of C.I.T. should have been held superior under section 2-403 to
those of the sellers, even though, as between Samuels and the sellers, the
sellers had superior rights. Though the mandate of section 2-403 may have
dictated a harsh result against the sellers in this particular instance, a better
reading of the "good faith" purchaser requirement would have upheld the
status of the inventory financer, C.I.T., as a good faith purchaser.
Finally, the court's treatment of the seller's reservation of title deserves
the sellers had not even come close to complying with that requirement. But see 510
F.2d at 157 (Godbold, I., dissenting).
195. Ch. 785, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 2343. This concept is now expressed, in
identical language, in TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.203 (a) (3) (Supp. 1975-76).
196. 510 F.2d at 150.
197. See, e.g., International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So.
2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
198. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (1968).
199. The requirements for value are set out in § 1-201(44). Id. § 1.201(44).
200. Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Id.
§ 1.201(19).
201. To be a purchaser, one must take by sale, discount negotiation, mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue, or gift. Id. § 1.201(32).
202. Id. § 1.201(19).
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comment. Section 2-401(1)203 classifies title retention devices as security
interests. The majority found that the cash sale in this case did not "fit" the
fact pattern in which a seller could 'be expected to perfect a security interest,
even though a purchase money security interest could always obtain undis-
puted priority over earlier perfected security interests. Again, the court
stretched the Code to achieve a result not provided therein. On rehearing
the court would do well to adopt the analysis of the dissenting opinion in
Samuels which adhered to a stricter interpretation of the Code.20 4
The conflicting rights of a pledgee and a lien creditor without knowledge of
a security interest were involved in Meadows v. Bierschwale.20 5  Biersch-
wale sold an apartment project to Oakes and received in exchange fifty-nine
promissory notes. Oakes later conveyed the same project to Goldman and
received in exchange notes executed by Goldman. When the fifty-nine notes
given by Oakes to Bierschwale in the first sale became worthless, Bierschwale
filed suit to rescind the sale and impress a constructive trust on the proceeds
of the Goldman notes. After this action had been commenced, Oakes, in
securing a prior debt unrelated to the land transaction, pledged a portion of
the Goldman notes to Smith. The court, upon hearing Bierschwale's
allegation of fraud and request for recission, ordered Goldman to place all
payments on the pledged notes into the registry of the court pending the
outcome of the litigation. Oakes then defaulted on the unrelated obligation
secured by the pledge. Smith, the pledgee-secured creditor, appealed from
the award to Bierschwale, who had been deemed a lien creditor as to the
proceeds of the sale to Goldman by reason of a constructive trust.
The security agreement between Oakes and Smith covering the pledged
notes contained the following provision: "[M]utation of collateral notes by
. . . acceptance of payment . . . shall inure to the benefit of . . . [Smith]
and a security interest in the same shall arise . . . in favor' of . . .
[Smith]. °20 6 This security agreement was filed as a financing statement in
Harris County, but not with the secretary of state. The court conceded that
the above language in the security agreement provided for a security interest
in the notes' proceeds, 20 7 but held that the security interest was unperfected
since a filing with the secretary of state was required under section 9-
401(1)(c). 2 08  Section 9-306(1) of the Code also provided that: "The
203. Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to the reservation of a security in-
terest. Id. § 2.401(a).
204. 510 F.2d at 157 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
205. 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974), rev'g 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1973).
206. 516 S.W.2d at 133.
207. Prior to the 1973 amendments, §§ 9.203(a) (2) and 9.306(b) of the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code were inconsistent as to whether proceeds were automatically
covered by a security interest. The 1973 amendments provided for an automatic interest
in proceeds and eliminated the requirement that the creditor check "proceeds" on the
financing statement. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.203(a)(2), 9.306(b)
(Supp. 1975-76), amending ch. 785, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 2343.
208. Section 9.401(a) (3) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, cited by the
court, is a catch-all provision indicating that filings should be made with the secretary
of state in all cases not covered by subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). The provisions of
this subsection were left unchanged by the 1973 amendments. TEx. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. § 9.401(a) (3) (Supp. 1975-76).
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security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if the
interest in the original collateral was perfected but it . . .becomes unper-
fected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless (1) a filed
financing statement covering the original collateral also covers proceeds
.... -209 The court combined sections 9-306(1), 9-401(1)(c) and 9-
401(2) and concluded that the failure to file a financing statement with the
secretary of state made Smith's security interest unperfected as to the
proceeds in the registry of the court. Therefore, his rights were inferior to
the claims of Bierschwale. Bierschwale, by reason of the constructive trust
imposed on the sale proceeds, was a lien creditor, and consequently, he was
entitled to priority under section 9-301 .210
This result, while not necessarily incorrect, is considerably outside the
normal commercial expectations of the business community. The court
mentioned that although Smith, as pledgee, was a "holder in due course" of
the notes,211 he did not take free of Bierschwale's claims arising under the
constructive trust. This result logically follows from the terms of the security
agreement permitting Oakes, the debtor-pledgor, to receive payments until
default on his obligation to Smith.212  Also, under the rationale of this
decision, the careful creditor will now need to file a financing statement with
the office of the secretary of state in order to perfect a security interest in
"identifiable cash proceeds" 213 of collateral in which a security interest has
been perfected by possession. 214  This may seem awkward initially, but it
may well be a prudent step.
Corpus Christi Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith215 considered the relative
priorities between unpaid materialmen and subcontractors, and a bank which
had a security interest in contract rights216 and accounts receivable of the
contractor. Manson Industries contracted with the city of Corpus Christi to
repair damage to the municipal airport. Prior to the contract in question,
209. The 1973 amendments substantially revised § 9.306 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code. Section 9.306(c)(2) now states that "a filed financing statement cov-
ers the original collateral and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds." Money and
checks are included as "cash proceeds." TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(c) (2)
(Supp. 1975-76), amending ch. 785, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 2343.
210. Under § 9-301 an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest and be-
fore it is perfected. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.301 (Supp. 1975-76).
211. "Holder in due course" is defined in § 3-302. Under § 3-303(b) one takes "for
value" if the note is taken as "security for an antecedent claim." TEX. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. § 3.303(2) (1968).
212. Section 9-502(1) provides for similar rights between the secured creditor and
debtor unless otherwise agreed. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.502(a) (Supp.
1975-76),
213. The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected interest if the in-
terest in the original collateral was perfected. But it ceases to be perfected 10 days after
receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless a filed financing statement covers the or-
iginal collateral and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds. Id. § 9.306(c)(2).
214. Section 9-304 and 9-305 state the perfection mechanisms for a security interest.
Id. §§ 9.304-.305.
215. 525 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1975).
216. Section 9.106 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code during the period cov-
ered by the instant case differentiated between "accounts" and "contract rights." The
two definitions were combined as "accounts" in the 1973 amendments. See TEX. Bus.




Manson Industries granted Corpus Christi Bank & Trust a security interest
in all accounts receivable then owed by Manson or thereafter acquired.
The security interest of the bank was duly perfected by a timely filing with
the secretary of state prior to award of the contract. Upon completion of the
project and certification of the work by the city, unpaid materialmen and
subcontractors asserted claims to the retainage of funds held by the city of
Corpus Christi, in which the bank had a security interest. Of the unpaid
claims, only one of the claimants had complied with article 5160217 so as to
perfect a claim under the payment bond against the surety. That claimant
was not involved in the appeal. However, the materialmen and subcontrac-
tors claimed priority as third-party beneficiaries under the contract between
the city and the contractor, Manson Industries.
The court first considered the contention of the claimants that they were
third party beneficiaries of the prime contract by reason of the clause requir-
ing proof of payment of subcontractors prior to payment by the city. The
claimants argued 218 that prior decisions219 denying third party beneficiary
status to subcontractors all involved private contracts, in which similar provi-
sions could foreseeably benefit the owner by minimizing the risk of liens
against the property. However, in a public contract situation this benefit to
the owner is absent because the property of the municipality is not subject
to any such lien and the city itself is not liable for such claims.220 Therefore,
the subcontractors argued that the proof of payment clause was intended for
their 'benefit. The court, finding no evidence of an intent to protect
claimants who had not perfected their liens under article 5160, followed the
private contract precedents and held that the contract, even with the proof of
payment provision, did not clearly evidence an intent to create third party
rights in favor of unpaid subcontractors. 221
The cases cited 222 by the court demonstrate the position of the Texas
courts that a contract will not be construed as giving rise to third party
beneficiary rights unless the intent of the parties is clear.223 The language
of the contract and public works bond indicated an intent to benefit those
subcontractors who complied with article 5160, and, therefore, the absence
of sufficient evidence to show a clear intent to benefit the subcontractors
defeated the third party beneficiary claim.224 The court also rejected the
claimants' contention that compliance by the contractor with the proof of
payment clause was a necessary condition to the contractor's right to
217. Article 5160 relating to performance bonds and bonds for materials and labor,
applies to public contracts over $2,000. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (1971).
Article 5472a provides an "informal" lien procedure for public contracts of less than
$2,000. Id. art. 5472a.
218. They prevailed below on this theory. See 512 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1975).
219. See, e.g., General Elec. Supply Co. v. Epco Constructors, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 112
(S.D. Tex. 1971).
220. 512 S.W.2d at 764.
221. 525 S.W.2d at 506.
222. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Bankers Life Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 76,
79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. 525 S.W.2d at 505.
224. Id. at 505-06.
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retainage. 225 Consequently, since Manson had no rights in the retained
funds, the bank did not have a perfected security interest. However, as the
court pointed out, Manson did have rights in the retainage. The retained
funds were "accounts" (in the pre-1974 sense), having been earned, and
were subject to the perfected security interest of the bank.22 6
In Associates Financial Services of Texas, Inc. v. Solomon227 the relative
priorities between a landlord's lien for rent and a secured creditor's unper-
fected security interest in collateral left on the leased premises by a defaulting
tenant were presented. The disputed collateral was purchased by the tenant
with funds advanced by plaintiff, who took a security interest in the goods
under the security agreement executed between the parties. Though the
financing statement was timely filed, the collateral in question was not listed.
The goods were placed on the leased premises and, some months later,
following a default in the payment of rent, the landlord took possession. The
landlord promptly filed an affidavit under the landlord's lien statutes
228
before the plaintiff had corrected its error by filing a proper financing
statement with respect to the goods. Both the landlord and secured creditor
claimed liens in the goods that were on the leased premises. Article 9 of the
UCC expressly excludes landlords' liens from the operation of the statute.
229
Finding no guidance in the Code, the court looked to pre-Code law and
noted that a landlord's lien had always been superior to any unrecorded
chattel mortgage, even though the mortgage might pre-date the landlord's
lien. Since plaintiff's security interest was unperfected at the time the
landlord's lien attached, the court concluded that the landlord's lien had
priority. 23 0
Gulf Coast State Bank v. Nelms2 3' dealt with the priority of a claim
partially excluded under the Code: the possessory lien of the mechanic who
repairs a chattel. 23 2 Buchanan furnished goods and services in repairing an
automobile subject to a bank's perfected security interest. Upon failure of
the debtor to pay for the repairs, Buchanan retained the automobile. When
the bank attempted to repossess the vehicle for delinquent payments,
Buchanan refused to release the car. The sole question presented was
whether Buchanan's possessory lien under articles 5503 and 5506233 was
entitled to priority over the bank's interest.
225. Id. at 506.
226. Id.
227. 523 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
228. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5238 (1962) prescribes the filing of a sworn
statement of the landlord to "secure" a lien for more than six months' rent. Id. art.
5222 provides for the lien itself.
229. Section 9-104(b) expressly excludes landlord's liens from the scope of art. 9.
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
230. 523 S.W.2d at 724.
231. 525 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1975), aff'g 516 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1974).
232. Section 9-104(c) excludes from the operation of art. 9 "a lien given by statute
or other rule of law for services or materials except as provided in Section 9.310 . .. .
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(3) (Supp. 1975-76). Section 9-310 provides
that a possessory lien for services or materials is prior to a perfected security interest
"unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise." Id. § 9.310.
233. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5503 (Supp. 1975-76); id. art. 5506 (1958).
[Vol. 30
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Section 9-310 of the Code provides that a possessory lien for services and
materials is entitled to priority over a perfected security interest "unless the
lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise. '234  The
supreme court interpreted the reference in section 9-310 to "the statute"
which must expressly provide for subordination of the mechanic's lien as
meaning only the mechanic's lien statute and not including the Certificate of
Title Act.235 The language in article 5506236 that a mechanic's possessory
lien shall not "affect or impair" other liens was held not to amount to an
"express" provision required by section 9-310 for subordination of the
mechanic's lien. 28 7 Therefore, the mechanic's possessory lien under articles
5503 and 5506 was held superior to the previously perfected security
interest. 28
B. Notice Requirements Following Default
The right of a secured creditor to recover a deficiency judgment following
a foreclosure sale was considered in two cases involving the creditor's failure
to give the notice of sale prescribed by the Code.28 9  In United States v.
Whitehouse Plastics2 40 the Small Business Administration sought to collect
from two guarantors of a loan to a corporation the deficiency which resulted
from a public auction of collateral. The court assumed that the guarantors
were "debtors" for purposes of the notice requirements of section 9-
504(3)241 and that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding
that reasonable notice had been received.
234. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (Supp. 1975-76).
235. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Supp. 1975-76). The repeal in 1971
of §§ 43 and 46 of the original Certificate of Title Act, art. 1436-1 of the Penal Code(now found as TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Supp. 1975-76)), amended by
ch. 123, § 7, [1971] Tex. Laws 896, lend support to the court's interpretation of these
statutes. 525 S.W.2d at 868-69. The court cited Comment 2 to § 9-310 in support of
its conclusion that Texas Business and Commerce Code § 9.310 requires that the lan-
guage of the statute creating the lien, arts. 5503 and 5506, be consulted to determine
whether the artisan's lien shall have priority. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310,
Comment 2, cited at 525 S.W.2d at 869.
236. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5506 (1958).
237. On this point the court cited its decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp.,
517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974), which held that the priority of a mechanic's and material-
man's lien over a deed of trust lien, as to removables, did not violate the language of
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (Supp. 1975-76), to the effect that the mechanic's
lien shall not affect a previously recorded deed of trust. 525 S.W.2d at 870. For a
discussion of Whirlpool see Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw.
L.J. 29, 48-49 (1975).
238. 525 S.W.2d at 870.
239. Section 9-504(2), as amended, provides that, in transactions other than sales of
accounts, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. Section 9-504(3), as enacted and
amended in Texas, calls for notice of a foreclosure sale to be sent (1) to the debtor,(2) to any other secured party with a financing statement on file "in this state" with
respect to the debtor, and (3) to any other secured party giving notice of a claim to
the collateral. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504(b), (c) (Supp. 1975-76),
amending ch. 785, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 2343.
240. 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974).
241. The version of § 9.504(c) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code in force
at the time of the disposition of the collateral, and, therefore, applied by the court, pro-
vided that reasonable notice of public or private sale be sent by the secured party to
the debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has per-
fected his security interest in the collateral by filing, or who is known by the creditor
to have a security interest in the collateral. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c)
19761
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The court was directly presented with the question of whether the failure
to comply with the notice requirements of section 9-504(3) precluded
recovery of the deficiency. The court adopted (and predicted that state
courts in Texas would adopt) the position that the failure to give notice does
not bar recovery of a deficency but rather gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the value of the collateral equalled the debt, placing the
burden on the secured party to prove that the value (and not just the
amount bid at the sale) was less than the debt.2 42 The court reasoned that
section 9-507,243 which specifically deals with remedies available in the
event a creditor fails to comply with the default provisions of the Code, was
intended to be the sole source of remedies in this situation. 244 The evidence
presented to the court, which was not limited to proof of the auction bids,
supported the conclusion that the fair market value of the collateral did not
exceed the amount realized on the sale. Therefore, the deficiency judgment
against the guarantors was sustained.
The second case, First State Bank v. Northrop,245 may lend support to the
view, rejected in Whitehouse Plastics, that failure to give reasonable notice
bars recovery of a deficiency judgment. Northrop had co-signed a note
secured by a lien. Following default, the secured creditor foreclosed by
private sale without giving any prior notice to Northrop. A deficiency letter
was sent three days later to Northrop, demanding payment of the balance
due on the note. The court affirmed a take-nothing judgment as to
Northrop, holding that there was probative evidence sufficient to support the
trial court's finding that reasonable notice had not been given before sale,
and that post-sale notice did not constitute reasonable notice under section 9-
504.
Whether such lack of notice per se barred a recovery and whether
evidence of the value of the collateral was admissible to establish the amount
of a deficiency were not expressly discussed on appeal. The opinion can,
however, be read as requiring reasonable pre-sale notice as a condition to
recovery of a deficiency. The trial court's take-nothing judgment was
characterized as being "expressly based . . .upon the conclusion that [the]
Bank failed to give . . . [reasonable] notice '24 6 under section 9-504(3).
The most likely interpretation of this statement is that the trial court was of
the view that failure to give notice automatically barred a deficiency
(1968). This section was amended in 1973 to require notice to persons other than the
debtor only if such persons had notified the secured party in writing of their claims of
an interest in the collateral before notification was sent to the debtor or before the debt-
or's renunciation of his rights. Ch. 400, § 5, [1973] Tex. Laws 999, amending TEx.
Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (1968).
242. The court collected numerous cases on both sides of this issue. 501 F.2d at 695
nn.3, 4. On deficiency rights and other foreclosure problems see Siegel, The Commer-
cially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral, 80 COMM. L.J. 67 (1975).
243. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.507 (Supp. 1975-76). The 1973 Texas re-
vision of art. 9 made no changes in this section.
244. 501 F.2d at 696. One of the principal architects of art. 9 has reached a con-
trary conclusion. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §
44.9.4 (1965).
245. 519 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
246. 519 S.W.2d at 162.
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recovery. The affirmance of the trial court judgment and the absence of
any discussion of the effect of the failure to give proper notice is a difficult
combination to analyze fruitfully, but the potential for a per se rule growing
out of Northrop should be recognized.
IV. CREDITORS' REMEDIES
During the survey period constitutional challenges of Texas creditors'
remedies had a significant effect upon Texas law. Self-help repossession
under the Uniform Commercial Code247 survived constitutional attack in
Calderon v. United Furniture Co.,248 a per curiam opinion issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In Calderon the
plaintiff brought suit for an allegedly wrongful repossession. Relying upon
its opinion in James v. Pinnix,249 the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 25 0 In James
the buyer of a used car had sued to restrain repossession of a car by the
dealer and to have the Mississippi self-help statute25 ' declared unconstitu-
tional. The district court granted the requested relief but the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that self-help repossession did not involve sufficient state
action to warrant due process scrutiny.252  Both Calderon and James
distinguish Hall v. Garson25 3 in which the court found sufficient state action
when, pursuant to a landlord lien provision, a landlady entered an apartment
and seized the tenant's possessions to satisfy a past due rent liability.25 4 In
Calderon the court distinguished Hall by pointing out that the statute
challenged 25 5 in that case allowed a landlord to seize property unconnected
to the rental debt, while self-help repossession under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code involves property in which the creditor has a security interest.2u
Since a state officer did not take part in the dispossession of goods in either
case, a determination of state action appears to have been dependent upon
whether a lien was created statutorily or contractually.
247. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-503, -504. These two provisions are codified
in Texas as TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.503, .504 (1968).
248. 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1975).
249. 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
250. The district court opinion is set out at 371 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
251. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-9-503 (1972).
252. 495 F.2d at 207. See also Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365
(5th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973). For a discussion of the self-help issue see Note, Self-Help Repossession Under
the UCC: Presence or Absence of State Action?, 28 Sw. L.J. 796 (1974). For an opin-
ion which finds the requisite state action in self-help repossession see Boland v. Essex
County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
253. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
254. Calderon, Hall, and James were appeals from the lower courts' rulings concern-
ing subject matter jurisdiction. All three plaintiffs had brought their actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and the fourteenth amendment. Calderon and James held there
was not sufficient state action to confer jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) or
the fourteenth amendment, while Hall held the requisite state action was present and
remanded for further proceedings. In a later appeal of the Hall case the court reached
the merits of the due process challenge. See note 262 infra and accompanying text.
255. Ch. 686, [1969] Tex. Laws 2008, as amended, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5236d (Supp. 1975-76).




Unlike self-help repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code, Texas
landlord lien provisions have not survived constitutional challenge. As
indicated above, the Fifth Circuit in Hall v. Garson257 found sufficient state
action in the Texas landlord lien statute 258 to allow federal court jurisdiction
under a fourteenth amendment challenge. 259 Although the seizure was not
conducted by an officer of the state, the court found that the act of seizure
under the statute possessed the characteristics of an act of the state since the
execution of a lien has traditionally been carried out in Texas by a state
official. 26 0 After remand and upon a subsequent appeal from a denial by
the district court of the requested relief,2 61 the Fifth Circuit held the statute
unconstitutional for failing to grant the tenant notice and hearing before his
goods were seized. 262 The court based its holding on the then recently
handed down Fuentes v. Shevin.263  The Texas Legislature subsequently
repealed 26 4 the statute held unconstitutional in Hall, replacing it with article
5236d.265  The new statute restricts a landlord's right to dispossess a tenant
of his property for unpaid rent to those situations where the rental agreement
clearly displays the contractual lien "underlined or printed in conspicuous
bold print. ' 266  However, in Fancher v. Cronan267 a federal district court
found the new statute involved state action and was unconstitutional due to
the act's failure to provide for notice and a hearing. Since the lien under
article 5236d is created by contract rather than by statute, the Fancher
holding appears to be unsound under the holdings in Calderon and
James.2 68
The Texas distress warrant statute269 also has not fared well. In
Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc.,270 the plaintiff had rented office space
from the defendant. When a dispute arose as to the rent due plaintiff
refused to make further payments. The defendant filed an affidavit under
257. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
258. Ch. 686, [1969] Tex. Laws 2008, as amended, TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art.
5236d (Supp. 1975-76).
259. 430 F.2d at 439.
260. Id.
261. The district court denied the requested injunctive relief in an unreported memo-
randum opinion.
262. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
263. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
264. Ch. 441, § 5, [19731 Tex. Laws 1228.
265. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1975-76).
266. Id. § 4.
267. Civil No. 75-H179 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (order withdrawn), noted in 7 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 613 (1975).
268. See notes 253-56 supra and accompanying text. See also Barrera v. Security
Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975), where the court upheld TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Supp. 1975-76), the Texas statute which regulates the private
foreclosure process of deeds of trust. The court found that there was not "a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 1171,
citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also Armenta v. Nuss-
baum, 519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
269. Tx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5239 (1962). See also TEx. R. Civ. P. 610-
20. The statute in conjunction with its procedural rules provides that upon a bond and
an affidavit stating that rent is overdue and there is danger the landlord will be de-
frauded, the sheriff may impound the tenant's property.
270. 525 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
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the provisions of the distress warrant statute, and the constable subsequently
dispossessed plaintiff of his property by changing the locks on the office
doors. The district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction,
but the court of appeals reversed, holding the distress warrant statute
unconstitutional for failure to meet due process standards.2 1  The court
utilized a recent United States Supreme Court holding272 to lay down a
three-pronged test 27 3 to examine the constitutionality of the statute. The
test requires that: (1) a judge participate in the issuing process; (2) the
affidavit contain specific allegations; (3) a hearing be available immediately
after seizure to determine the validity of the claims. The court found that a
distress warrant could only be issued by a justice of the peace under the
Texas statute.2 74 However, the court also determined that the rules accom-
panying the statute275 permitted issuance of the warrant upon mere conclu-
sory allegations and that the statute failed to provide for an immediate post-
seizure hearing.276 Hence, the court adjudged due process protection to be
lacking and declared the statute unconstitutional.
A test similar to that used in Stevenson had been employed earlier by a
United States District Court in Garcia v. Krause,277 in which the Texas
sequestration statute278 was held unconstitutional. The Texas Legislature
has recently amended the sequestration statute27 9 so as to conform with the
constitutional requirements set out in Garcia.280  The amended statute
requires issuance of the writ by a judicial officer,'2 ' the allegation of specific
facts upon which the judicial officer may draw a reasonable conclusion that
the issuance of the writ is justified, 282 and the opportunity for an immediate
post-seizure hearing to take place not later than ten days after a debtor's
motion for dissolution. 2 3  Since the amended statute is extremely similar to
the Louisiana statute2 4 upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,285 there should not be great doubt as to its
271. Id. at 735.
272. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted
in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975). The court also made reference to three earlier cases:
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). For a discussion of the above cases see
Comment, Constitutional Dimensions of the Amended Texas Sequestration Statute. 29
Sw. L.J. 884 (1975).
273. 525 S.W.2d at 734.
274. Id.
275. TEx. R. Civ. P. 610-20.
276. Id. at 734-35.
277. 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974). For a discussion of the court's holding
see Note, Pre-Judgment Seizures and the Due Process Clause: North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 29 Sw. L.J. 660, 666 n.55 (1975).
278. Ch. 44, [1887] Tex. Laws 30, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 828 (1898),
as amended, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (Supp. 1975-76).
279. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (Supp. 1975-76). For an in-depth discus-
sion of the amended sequestration statute see Comment, supra note 272.
280. The requirements set by Garcia are substantially the same as those set out in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
281. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, § 1 (Supp. 1975-76).
282. Id. §§ 1,2.
283. Id. § 3.
284. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).




The upcoming survey year also promises to be significant for Texas
creditors' remedies. The Texas garnishment statute287 was recently held
unconstitutional in Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc.2 8 8 on
grounds similar to those employed in Garcia.289  Since the United States
Supreme Court in North Georgia Finishing, Inc., v. Di-Chem, Inc.290 has
recently affirmed the due process requirements found to be constitutional
requisites in Wee Tote, one may expect that the garnishment statute will
soon be revised to meet those requirements. 291  One also hopes that the
Fifth Circuit will review the Fancher holding so as to clarify the constitutional
status of self-help in Texas creditors' remedies.
V. LEGISLATION
The last session of the Texas Legislature saw the enactment of numerous
new statutes which will affect commercial transactions within the state. Some
of the more significant of these are summarized below.
Interest-Real Estate Loans Secured by Lien. The 64th Legislature adopted
a new act,292 article 5069-1.07, governing interest charged on real estate
loans. Article 5069-1.07(a) provides for the "spreading" of interest pay-
ments on loans "secured, in whole or in part, by a lien, mortgage, security
interest, or other interest in or with respect to any interest in real proper-
ty."'293 The second portion of the new statute permits "any person" to pay
"the same rate of interest as corporations (other than non-profit corpora-
tions)" for loans in principal amounts of $500,000 or more for the purpose
of interim construction financing on real property or for the purpose of
"financing or refinancing of improved real property.
'294
The relevant statute governing corporate interest rates2 95 does not specify
a rate for "corporations (other than non-profit corporations)." It does,
however, prohibit the defense of usury by a corporation (except "charitable
or religious" corporations) where the aggregate obligation exceeds $5,000
and the rate of interest does not exceed one-and-one-half percent per
month.296 The legislature's intent as to the permissible rate should be clear
enough to guide a court to the proper statute. There are, however, other
286. If there is an obvious flaw in the statute it may be that the burden is upon the
debtor to come forward and request a post-seizure hearing. See, e.g., LA. CODE CrV.
PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961). For one writer's view that the amended statute is
still unconstitutional see Comment, supra note 272.
287. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (1966).
288. 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). See
also Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1974, writ granted).
289. 350 F. Supp. at 1259.
290. 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975).
291. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1966), the Texas attachment statute, may
require revision for the same reasons. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the
Texas attachment and garnishment provisions see Comment, supra note 272, at 899-903.
292. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Supp. 1975-76).
293. Id. art. 5069-1.07(a).
294. Id. art. 5069-1.07(b).




questions presented by the text of the new act which should be recognized.
First, the use of the phrase "other than non-profit corporation" should be
taken simply as identifying the applicable rate and should not be read as
restricting or modifying the statement that "any person" may borrow at the
higher rates on appropriate loans. "Any person" means "any person" and
not "any person other than non-profit corporations." Second, the use of the
phrase "non-profit corporations" in the new statute raises a question as to
what the legislature originally meant in article 1302-2.09 by the phrase
"charitable or religious" corporation. One can conceive of religious or
charitable corporations that operate for a profit, as well as non-profit
corporations that are not charitable or religious. The most clear-cut way to
resolve this issue would be to amend article 1302-2.09 to refer to "non-profit
corporation." Third, the scope of the statute is made somewhat unclear by
reason of the phrases "interim construction financing" and "improved real
property." Each is capable of varying interpretations and will likely give rise
to future litigation.
Interest-Judgments. Article 5069-1.05 was amended to increase the
interest rate of judgments from six percent to nine percent, or such higher
rate, if any, agreed upon in the underlying contract.2 97  This statute was
effective September 1, 1975.
Sales Under Deed of Trust-Advertising. Article 3810,298 governing the
process of -foreclosure under deeds of trust, was amended by the legisla-
ture. 299 Notice of the sale must now be given by posting a written notice at
least twenty-one days preceding the date of sale, at the door of the
courthouse in the county(ies) specified in the act. In addition, at least
twenty-one days preceding the date of sale, written notice must be mailed to
each debtor by certified mail addressed to the last address shown on the
creditor's records for each such debtor. By its terms, this statute becomes
effective on January 1, 1976, and governs sales only after that date.
Judgment Liens-Discharge After Bankruptcy. Article 5449(a)800 was
added by the legislature to provide a means of clearing records of judgments
and abstracts of judgments affecting bankrupts. One year after a discharge
is granted, the bankrupt, debtor, other specified persons, or "any other
interested person" may apply for the discharge and cancellation of any
judgment, and of any abstract of judgment, relating to discharged obliga-
tions. The application should be filed with the court that rendered the
judgment in question. Provision is also made in certain cases for limiting the
effect of judgment liens based on undischarged obligations or liens affecting
property "abandoned during the course of the proceeding."
Secured Transactions-Revisions. Certain provisions of chapter 9 of the
Texas Business & Commerce Code were amended in minor respects by the
297. Id. art. 5069-1.05.
298. Id. art. 3810 (1966).
299. Ch. 723, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 2354.
300. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5449(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
1976]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
legislature. 801 The amendments were made for clarification and to correct
some slight inconsistencies with other statutes. 80 2
Livestock-Purchase for Slaughter. In an apparent response to In re
Samuels & Co. 303 the legislature enacted a statute providing special protection
for persons selling livestock for slaughter. The new act 304 regulates the pay-
ment procedures 3 5 to be followed by "meat processors," as defined by the
act,30 6 provides for twelve percent damages in the event the statutory proce-
dures or agreed methods of payment are not satisfied,307 and grants a lien
on the livstock sold, the carcasses and products, and all proceeds thereof.308
This lien is given priority over hny conflicting liens or security interests.309
Banks-Branch Banks-Connecting Facilities. The provisions of the Texas
Banking Code310 regulating the operation of "connected" office facilities and
drive-in facilities were amended. 311 Closed-circuit televisions systems were
added to the permissible methods of "connecting" facilities to the central
bank building. The county population limitations on distant312 automobile
drive-in facilities were removed,31 3 but the definition of "automobile drive-
in facility" precludes the use of a walk-up window as part of the drive-in
facility.3 14
Escheat-Depositories-Dormant Deposits and Inactive Accounts. A new
statute amends the statutes regulating the escheat of deposits and ac-
counts.3 18  The financial institutions reporting under the statute will be
required to remit to the state treasurer the total amount of funds in the
dormant accounts and will not be able to retain accounts in excess of $25.00
if the institution feels further efforts should 'be made to locate the owner.
301. Ch. 353, §§ 1-9, [1975] Tex. Laws 940-43, amending TEx. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.110, 9.402(c), (e), (f), 9.403(e)-(g), 9.404(c), 9.405(a), (d), 9.406,
9.504(c), 9.505(b) (1968).
302. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6626, 6627, 6630 (1969), as amended, ch. 353,
§§ 13-15, [1975] Tex. Laws 944-45.
303. 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975) (rehearing en banc granted, May 19, 1975); see
notes 189-204 supra and accompanying text.
304. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6910b (Supp. 1975-76).
305. Id. § 2.
306. Id. § 1(b).
307. Id. § 3. The same section authorizes the collection of interest and attorneys'
fees.
308. Id. § 4.
309. Id. § 7.
310. Id. arts. 41-101 to-951 (1973).
311. Id. art. 342-903 (1973), as amended, ch. 215, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 531.
312. Automatic drive-in facilities may now be located between 500 and 2000 feet
from the bank building, an increase from the 500- to 1850-feet rule previously in effect.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Supp. 1975-76).
313. The former provision limited the availability of drive-in facilities to banks in
counties of over 350,000 population.
314. The drive-in facilities permitted under the new act are defined to mean facilities
"offering banking services solely to persons who arrive at such facility in an automobile
and remain during the transaction of business with the bank."
315. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b, §§ 4, 5 (Supp. 1975-76).
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